Secure open-air communication system utilizing multichannel decoyed transmission

ABSTRACT

A secure communication system utilizes multiple “decoy” data signals to hide one or more true data signals. The true data signal(s) are encrypted, and received at a scrambling unit according to an original set of channel assignments. The channel assignments are optically switched with multiple decoy data signals to form a multi-channel “scrambled” output signal that is thereafter transmitted across a communication system. The greater the number of decoy signals, the greater the security provided to the open-air system. Further security may be provided by encrypting the decoy signals prior to scrambling and/or by utilizing a spatially diverse set of transmitters and receivers. Without the knowledge of the channel assignment(s) for the true signal(s), an eavesdropper may be able to intercept (and, with time, perhaps descramble) the open-air transmitted signals, will not be able to distinguish the true data from the decoys without also knowing the channel assignment(s).

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.14/281,032, filed May 19, 2014 (now U.S. Pat. No. 9,596,049), which is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/602,218, filed Sep. 3, 2012(now U.S. Pat. No. 8,767,958), which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 12/907,417, filed Oct. 19, 2010 (now U.S. Pat. No.8,259,933), which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.11/082,515, filed Mar. 16, 2005 (now U.S. Pat. No. 7,848,517), all ofwhich are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to an open-air communication system and,more particularly, to an open-air communication system with increasedsecurity by utilizing a multi-channel, decoyed transmission technique.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Battlefield and tactical military communications have typically reliedon field-deployed fiber optics and relatively low bandwidth radiodistribution architectures to provide critical “field” communicationsinfrastructures. While optical fiber provides broadband capabilities, itis often exposed to unintentional (and sometimes intentional) damage,limiting its operational life to a few days or hours before repair orreplacement is required. Moreover, fiber is not easily deployed inmobile and frontline environments. Existing radio systems have provenrobustness and mobility, but are severely lacking in bandwidthcapabilities that are considered critical for modern warfare. Theavailability and utilization of broadband multi-channel point-to-pointradio and Free Space Optical Communications (FSOC) technologies providesa means to bring fiber-like bandwidth closer to the front lines and aslayered transport for broadband mobile area radios at the ground leveland beyond. The bandwidth capacity of these broadband technologiesprovides new applications and opportunities, including enhancedcommunication services and the potential for enhanced communicationsecurity. The enhanced capabilities of these broadband wirelesstechnologies is gaining the attention and consideration of variousmilitary services. Indeed, the use of FSOC and radio broadband linksprovides enormous benefits for military field deployments. However, theopen air aspect of these technologies comes at the cost of potentialinterception by unintentional or hostile forces. Since these broadbandlinks will be carrying large amounts of critical information, theyclearly would be targets of interest for interception by hostile forces.

Free-space optical communication and millimeter (mm) radio systems offertwo-way information transfer between remote locations without the use ofwires and/or optical fibers, but each technology has transmissiondistance limitations associated with extreme fog, rain, smoke and dustattenuation that must be taken into consideration if optimal performanceis to be expected. Hybrid FSOC/radio systems that are configured totransmit in both optical and radio frequencies (either alternately orsimultaneously) have been shown to significantly reduce the attenuationeffects of rain and fog and improve link performance under difficultweather conditions. Commercial versions of broadband hybrid HRL optical(FSOC) and radio wireless point-to-point systems have been in use sincethe late 1980's. Advanced free-space optical systems are now starting todeploy multiple optical wavelength transmission systems similar infunction to the optical DWDM techniques. Based on the FCC's wireless“boundary of interest” set at 1 mm wavelength, FSOC's wavelengths andbeam shaping techniques are thus not subject to licensing, spectruminterferences and the limits of shared capacity, as are the existing RFwireless technologies. Further, free-space optical communicationssystems may implement local area mesh network technologies forinformation transfer, or point-to-multipoint technology for a two-wayinformation exchange free of government regulation or intervention.

The increasing use of free-space optical communication, as well asopen-air point-to-point mm wave radio communication, for real-timegovernment, military, and secure commercial communication applicationsis placing an increasing burden on methods for reducing thevulnerability of these “open” communication paths to undesired orhostile interception.

Real-time, field-transmitted data and associated data encryption keystypically have a time-dependent component after which the usefulness ofthe data to the desired receiver (or hostile interceptor) greatlydiminishes. As such, any effective “security” method that cansignificantly delay (or stop) the undesired receiver's ability to deriveuseful data from an open-air transmission would be of interest tocommunities that rely on such open-air communication methods. Clearly,it is impractical and unrealistic to assume open air communications canavoid being intercepted by unwanted “motivated” recipients. Therefore,methods need to be employed that accept the reality of physicalinterception of the “through the air” communication by hostilerecipients, while providing greatly increased complexity and timerequired to derive useful data from the intercepted transmission (thus,at best, recovering some portion of the information well beyond the timelimit of its useful operational life).

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The need remaining in the prior art is addressed by the presentinvention, which relates to an open-air communication system and, moreparticularly, to an open-air communication system with increasedsecurity by utilizing a multi-channel, decoyed transmission technique.

In accordance with the present invention, at least one “true” datastream and a plurality of separate “decoy” data streams all transmittedsimultaneously (using the enhanced bandwidth capacity of broadbandoptical/radio channels), with the decoy streams used to “hide” the truedata stream(s). Prior to being transmitted, the various data streams(both true and decoy) are continuously scrambled in the time domainamong a plurality of different wavelength channels (“channel hopping”).The plurality of channel-hopped signals is then transmitted through theopen air to an intended receiver. Since only the intended receiver is inpossession of both the key required to de-scramble the various datastreams and the identity of the “true” data channel assignments (oncedescrambling has been applied), the ability for an unintended recipientto recover the true data stream(s) in a timely fashion is extremelylimited.

In one embodiment of the present invention, more than one “true” datastream may be transmitted. As long as a sufficient number of “decoy”streams are used, a sufficient level of security can be retained. Inanother embodiment, both the true data signal(s) and the decoy datasignals are encrypted to provide an additional layer of security, thusdecreasing the possibility of a hostile party intercepting, decoding andlater reassembling the message(s) from simultaneous recordings of allthe channels.

Data may be loaded onto the multiple decoy channels by the utilizationof random number “bit” generators for each channel (thus providing atruly random string of “decoy” data packets). Alternatively, enhanceddecoy deception can be achieved through the use of “available” multipleunsecured or commercial video (live or recorded), and/or voice/musicmedia that when loaded onto the individual decoy channels will produce“realistic” encoded bit patterns that would be difficult to distinguishfrom true non-decoy data by undesired human or computer analysis withouthaving possession of the key. True and decoy channels would be clearlydistinguished by a human observer receiving the encrypted media channelsand having possession of the correct key. Without the aid of the properkey, a “human receiver” would be unable to distinguish a channelcarrying encrypted “live” video conference data from a decoy channelcarrying an encrypted, prerecorded rock music video. With the proper keyrequired to de-scramble the signals, the true video conference channelwould be obvious among the channel choices for the proper humanreceiver.

In an extension of the teaching of the present invention, a plurality ofspatially disparate transmitters and spatially disparate receivers maybe used, with the true data signal being not only “channel hopped”, but“transmitter hopped”. Again, a human observer (or computer) inpossession of the proper de-scrambling key will know the sequencerequired to re-stitch the true data signal(s) back together at theoutput of the multiple receivers.

Although the subject matter of the present invention is clearly relevantto optical and radio wireless secure transmission methods, it is to beunderstood that the same approach may be equally applied to secure DWDMfiber optics links. Additionally, “hybrid” configurations, as describedabove, may also benefit from the application of the multi-channel,decoyed transmission system of the present invention. In this case, thetrue data and decoy signals may be “hopped” between optical and radiosignal paths to provide further diversity/scrambling in the open-aircommunication system.

Other and further embodiments and advantages of the present inventionwill become apparent during the course of the following description andby reference to the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Referring now to the drawings,

FIG. 1 contains a simplified block diagram of an exemplary arrangementfor implementing the multi-channel, decoyed open-air transmission systemof the present invention;

FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary architecture that may be used in oneembodiment of the present invention; and

FIG. 3 contains a diagram illustrating an alternative embodiment of thepresent invention employing transmitter/receiver spatial diversity toprovide additional security to the open-air transmission.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

As will be discussed in detail below, the present invention is relatedto an Open-air multi-channel communication link, such densewavelength-division multiplexed (multi-wavelength DWDM) free-space opticlinks and multi-channel orthogonal frequency-division multiplexed(multi-channel OFDM) radio links. A significant aspect of the presentinvention is the transmission of a small number of “true” data signalsalong with a plurality of “decoy” data signals. The true and decoy datasignals are processed at an open-air multi-channel transmitter so as to“hop” channels based on a secret sequence, where in a preferredembodiment both the true and decoy signals are encrypted prior toinitiating the hopping function. Thus, instead of a simple encryptedtransmission, as in the prior art, the present invention provides truedata signal transmission that hops channels, interspersed with similardecoy transmissions that hop in and out of the same channels so as to“hide” the true data signal(s) among a plurality of decoy data signals.The intent is to increase the difficulty of deciphering the message, aswell as to increase the complexity of a receiver configuration (i.e.,requiring a wider bandwidth) that would be required by an eavesdropper.

FIG. 1 contains a simplified diagram illustrating, in general terms, theprinciples of the present invention as can be applied in any type of“open air” communication system—optical, radio or a hybrid combinationof the two. In the arrangement as illustrated in FIG. 1, it is presumedthat the first data signal stream (labeled “a”) is the “true” datasignal, and the remaining data signal streams (labeled “b” through “n”)are “decoy” data signals (in some cases, more than one “true” datasignal may be transmitted). As shown, the plurality of data signalstreams are applied as parallel inputs to a channel scrambler 10, wherechannel scrambler 10 is controlled by a scrambling key generator 12. Keygenerators are well-known in the art, and any suitable arrangement maybe used for the purposes of the present invention. As illustrated inFIG. 1, the combination of channel scrambler 10 and scrambling keygenerator 12 functions to “hop” the packets of each signal stream in arandom pattern (controlled by the scrambling key) such that each outputchannel 1, 2, . . . n from channel scrambler 10 comprises packets ofeach data signal stream (both true and decoy). The multi-channel,scrambled outputs from channel scrambler 10 are subsequently applied asparallel inputs to multi-channel transmitter 14, where transmitter 14 isan “open air” transmitter and functions to essentially broadcast theplurality of n signals, as illustrated by open air transmission path 16in FIG. 1.

Inasmuch as the broadcasted signals are scrambled across the pluralityof n separate channels (wavelengths/frequencies) and include a number of“decoy” signals, the ability of an eavesdropper to recover any relevantdata is minimal. While an eavesdropper may be able to physically recoverthe plurality of n broadcasted signals, his ability to de-scramble thesignals is extremely limited. Moreover, the inclusion of a number ofdecoy signals makes the process even more difficult in that aneavesdropper would not be able to tell the difference between the truedata and the decoy data without knowing the identity of the true datachannel assignments. Obviously, as the number of channels and/or thenumber of decoy signals increases, the robustness of the security systemincreases as well. Moreover, as mentioned above, “realistic” signals maybe used as the decoy streams (live/recorded video, music, etc.) suchthat these signals will generate encoded bit patterns difficult todistinguish from the true data. Alternatively, random number generatorsmay be used to provide the decoy data streams (considered to be a lessexpensive alternative). In either case, without the knowledge of theparticular channel assignments, an eavesdropper will in most cases beunable to ascertain which channel(s) are carrying true data.

Referring again to FIG. 1, the plurality of n scrambled signals isintercepted by an open-air receiver 18, where receiver 18 is theintended receiving device and comprises a multi-channel receiver capableof separately recovering each one of the plurality of n signals. Theplurality of n recovered signals is then applied as a set of parallelinputs to a channel descrambler 20, where channel descrambler 20 iscontrolled by a descrambling key 22. It is to be understood that inaccordance with the principles of the present invention, both scramblingkey 12 and descrambling key 22 are “known” by each end of thecommunication path, with the particulars of descrambling key 22 beingdefined so as to “unscramble” the particular hopping sequence applied bychannel scrambler 10. Thus, the various packets generated as an outputfrom channel descrambler 20 will be re-assembled into a plurality ofseparate signals, each in its original data signal stream (both true anddecoy), as shown in FIG. 1.

In accordance with the present invention, the receiver of theinformation must also possess the knowledge regarding the identity ofwhich channel(s) contain true data signal(s). Thus, at the output ofchannel descrambler 20, the re-assembled versions of decoy data signalstreams “b”-“n” can simply be ignored (hence, these data signal streamsare illustrated in phantom in the output from channel descrambler 20),and the “recovered” true data signal “a” is put in the hands of itsintended recipient.

The encryption of both a large number of false decoy signals and asingle (or few) true data signal(s), in accordance with the presentinvention, is not considered to compromise the desired transmissionbetween each link. in an open air transmission system, but does add tothe check sum strength of the true signal transmission protection and,conversely, to the processing complexity required for an “intercepting”receiver who is blind to the key controller algorithm.

In terms of functionality, a free-space optics link with multiplewavelengths is similar to a multi-channel point-to-point (PTP) radiolink that employs directional antennas at each end. In addition, thereare point-to-multipoint (PMP) and peer-to-peer radio systems that useomnidirectional antennas to communicate with units in anunspecified/unknown direction. The application of the present inventionto free-space radio transmission systems is best illustrated by a PTPOFDM (orthogonal frequency division multiplexing) radio link. OFDM is aspecific means of conveniently transmitting radio signals on multiplefrequency carriers. In this technique, the multiple carriers overlap inthe spectrum domain. Transmission and reception involves the use ofinverse Fast Fourier Transforms (IFFT) and FFT, respectively, to be ableto insert and extract information on frequency carriers. In associationwith the present invention, the true data signal bit stream is channeledto different OFDM carriers at different times, as shown in FIG. 1. Atthe receiver, the true data signal is extracted by selecting differentchannels based on the descrambler key and stitching back (re-assembling)the data stream, ignoring the decoy signals.

In principle, the multi-channel communication system as used in thepresent invention can be any multi-frequency system, and need not bebased on OFDM. For example, multiple channels of an 802.11 wireless LANmay be used. In this case, besides hiding the true signal among decoysignals, a transmitter with enough power and resources can effectivelyjam an area by using the decoy signals to suppress other uses of theradio spectrum. This may be particularly relevant in semi-militarysituations in an area with other unlicensed radios.

While the diagram of FIG. 1 (as well as the remaining figures)illustrate the principles of the present invention as applied in ahalf-duplex arrangement, it is to be understood that the presentinvention is equally applicable to a full duplex arrangement utilizingoperational transceivers at various link locations, each transceiverequipped with the necessary scrambling and descrambling keys.

In a further embodiment of the present invention, an encryptiontechnique may be applied to both the true and decoy data prior toscrambling, thus adding another level of security to the open airtransmission. FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary arrangement employing bothencryption and channel hopping/scrambling in accordance with the presentinvention. In this particular embodiment, a plurality of X “true” datasignals are desired to be transmitted through an open air communicationsystem in as secure an arrangement as possible. A plurality of N “decoy”data signals are employed to supplement the plurality of X true signalssuch that a total of N+X data signals will be transmitted through theopen-air communication system. As shown in FIG. 2, data from a datasource 30 is used as the input for the plurality of X data signals 32and a signal generator 34 is used to supply the plurality of N decoysignals. A data encryption system 36 is then used to separately encodeeach one of the plurality of N+X signals. The encrypted signals are thenapplied as separate, parallel inputs to a key-controlled dynamiccross-connect element 38, where element 38 is configured in accordancewith the output from a key controller 40. In an alternative arrangement(not shown), the data may be encrypted elsewhere, and arrive at thetransmitter in its encrypted form. In this case, the already-encrypteddata is combined with the decoy information and transmitted in themanner discussed above.

As mentioned above, the decoyed, frequency-hopped secure transmissionsystem of the present invention is equally applicable to open-air,radio-signal based transmission systems as well as open-air,optical-signal based transmission systems and multi-wavelength DWDM andCWDM fiber optics links. The particular arrangement as shown in FIG. 2illustrates a hybrid system, where the input signals (true data anddecoy data) are electrical and the encryption occurs in the electricaldomain. Similarly, the channel hopping key is applied, using dynamiccross-connect element 38, in the electrical domain. Thus, the outputfrom dynamic cross-connect element 38 is a plurality of N+X encrypted,channel-hopped electrical data signals. These electrical signals arethen used as an input to an array of N+X optical transmitting devices42, where each device in the array operates at a different wavelengthλ1−λn (n=N+X) and thus produces a plurality of N+X optical, scrambledsignals.

The plurality of N+X optical signals are thereafter applied as separateinputs to a DWDM multiplexer 44 so as to form an optical output signalcomprising a multiplexed version of the various signals. It is to beunderstood that the multiplexing function is merely used to form theoptical output signal and does not enhance the encryption/scramblingcharacteristics of the present invention. The multiplexed signal may beamplified (for example, using an optical amplifier 46) and then appliedas an input to a free space optical transmitter 48. The multiplexedoptical signal then propagates through free space (represented by thenumeral 50 in FIG. 2) and is thereafter received by a free space opticalreceiver module 52. Inasmuch as the signal propagates through freespace, various “hostile” receivers may also intercept the transmittedsignal. However, in accordance with the present invention, it will bevirtually impossible for a hostile receiver to: (1) descramble themultiplexed signal stream; (2) decrypt the “descrambled” signals; and(3) determine that one or more channels are associated with “decoy”data. Thus, the use of scrambled, decoy signals (with encryption in thisembodiment) is thought to form a secure method for implementing open airtransmission.

Referring back to FIG. 2, the recovery of the plurality of X true datasignals by the intended receiver begins with amplifying (if necessary,using an optical amplifier 54, for example) the received optical signaland demultiplexing the received signal into a plurality of N+X separateoptical signals. A conventional demultiplexer 56 is used for thisfunction, where the plurality of N+X optical output signals fromdemultiplexer 56 is applied as an input to a plurality of photodiodes58, used to perform an optical-to-electrical conversion on the pluralityof N+X signals. As shown, the plurality of N+X electrical signals (whichare still scrambled and encrypted) are applied as an input to a channelswitching matrix 60, where a dynamic key controller 62 is applied as thesecond input to switching matrix 60. As with the arrangement describedabove, the “keys” used at the transmitter and receiver are identical(and known only to the bona fide transmitter and bona fide receiver) sothat the scrambling performed within cross-connect 38 at the transmittermay be “undone” at switching matrix 60, and the original (stillencrypted) signals re-assembled into a plurality of N decoy signals andX true signals, as shown. Inasmuch as the intended receiver will knowthe identity of the channel(s) assigned to the true data, the N decoysignals may be ignored and the “known” decryption algorithm applied to adata decryption module 64 so as to recover the X separate true datasignals.

It is to be understood that in the concept of decoyed multi-wavelengthtree-space optical applications in accordance with the above-describedembodiment of FIG. 2, the electrical-to-optical conversion andutilization of an electrical channel switching matrix can be equallyimplemented by using all-optical switching mechanisms that require noconversions. Such optical switching devices are available in many forms,such as through the utilization of photonic crystals and/or MEMS-arrayedsteering mirrors. Additionally, this arrangement (as with that ofFIG. 1) can also be implemented in a full-duplex mode.

Further, the multiple wavelength source for this particular embodimentof the present invention does not, by its nature, exclude a broad rangeof suitable wavelength sources and modulation techniques thatalternatively may be used in accordance with the present invention. Themultiple wavelength transmission source can be provided, for example,from a number of existing sources such as existing fiber optic networkDWDM sources, or local multiple laser arrays that are directly modulatedor multiple wavelength specific CW laser or LED/vixel arrays thatutilize externally controlled modulators. In fact, a suitable whitelight source and wavelength/channel generating diffraction grating ornarrow channel optical filters coupled to a wavelength/channel specificexternal high speed optical modulators and amplifiers may equally beemployed to generate a spectrally broad range of wavelengths/modulatedchannels of interest. It is assumed that standard optical amplificationtechniques may be employed, where appropriate, to make up for systemlosses.

In a further variation of the teachings of the present invention, aplurality of spatially disparate transmitters and a similar plurality ofspatially disparate receivers may be utilized to further improve thesecurity of open-air communication through the use of spatial diversity.Referring to FIG. 3, a relatively simple embodiment of this variation isshown, using a set of three spatially disparate transmitters 14-1, 14-2and 14-3 and a set of three spatially disparate receivers 18-1, 18-2 and18-3. In this particular embodiment, the “transmitters” and “receivers”are illustrated as “transceivers” (i.e., capable of transmission in bothdirections, as indicated by the arrows). Further, the transceivers areillustrated (in the enlarged portions of the figure) as including bothan optical transceiver and a radio transceiver, thus being able toprovide optical/radio diversity in association with the spatialdiversity.

In accordance with the present invention, channel scrambler 10 isconfigured to provide continuous channel hopping between the separateoutputs of each transmitter, as controlled by a single scrambling key12. The same set of true data signals (denoted by input data stream“a”), and the same plurality of decoy signals (denoted by streams “b”through “n”) are applied as inputs to scrambler 10. The scrambledoutputs are subsequently applied as inputs to associated open-airmulti-channel transmitters 14-1, 14-2 and 14-3.

As shown in FIG. 3, the outputs from transmitters 14-1, 14-2 and 14-3are thereafter broadcast through free space and received bymulti-channel receivers 18-1, 18-2 and 18-3. Since descrambler 20 iscontrolled by the same channel hopping key (through descrambling key22), only the desired receiving party will be able to identify the truedata packets and re-stitch the aggregated and temporally unsynchronizedpackets back together in the proper order. In this case, switching ofthe channels between the spatially diverse transmitters effectivelycreates wavelength and transmitter-specific data “packets” that arerouted based on the key known only by scrambling key 12 and descramblingkey 22, with the spatial diversity of using multiple transmitters andreceivers allowing for the true and decoy data to be broken up intodisjointed and uncorrelated “packets” of data that would be meaninglessto an observer that is not in possession of the proper “receiverstitching” key. As with the arrangement described above in associationwith FIG. 2, a decryption unit 64 may be utilized to recover the “true”data from its encrypted version once it has been restored in its propertime sequence.

While the foregoing has described what are considered to be the bestmode and/or other preferred embodiments of the invention, it is to beunderstood that various modifications may be made therein and that theinvention may be implemented in various forms and embodiments, and thatit may be applied in numerous applications, only some of which have beendescribed herein. It is intended by the following claims to claim anyand all modifications and variations that fall within the true scope ofthe invention.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: encrypting, by a processingsystem including a processor, at least one true data signal resulting inan encrypted at least one true data signal; encrypting, by theprocessing system, a plurality of decoy data signals resulting inencrypted decoy data signals; scrambling, by the processing system, theencrypted at least one true data signal and the encrypted decoy datasignals at a channel scrambler to generate a plurality of scrambledsignals, wherein the channel scrambler is controlled by a scrambling keyto facilitate hopping an original channel and transmitter assignmentsfor sequential packets of both the at least one true data signal and theplurality of decoy data signals; and transmitting, by the processingsystem, the plurality of scrambled signals using a plurality ofmulti-channel secure channel-hopping transmitters positioned atphysically disparate locations, wherein the plurality of scrambledsignals are received at a plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping receivers positioned at physically disparate locations,wherein a channel de-scrambler is coupled to each of the plurality ofchannel-hopping receivers and is controlled by a de-scrambling key tofacilitate recovery of the at least one true data signal from theplurality of scrambled signals.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein theplurality of scrambled signals are transmitted via an open-aircommunication system.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality ofscrambled signals are transmitted via a fiber-optic communicationsystem.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted at least onetrue data signal and the encrypted decoy data signals are applied asseparate parallel inputs to the channel scrambler.
 5. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the processing system operates at least partially in anelectrical domain and at least partially in an optical domain.
 6. Themethod of claim 5, wherein the at least one true data signal and thedecoy data signals comprise electrical signals and are encrypted in theelectrical domain.
 7. The method of claim 5, wherein the plurality ofscrambled signals are transmitted in the optical domain.
 8. The methodof claim 1, wherein the plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping transmitters comprise an array of optical transmittingdevices each operating at a different wavelength.
 9. The method of claim1, wherein at least one of the plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping receivers comprises a transceiver.
 10. The method ofclaim 9, wherein the transceiver comprises an optical transceiver and aradio transceiver.
 11. A device comprising: a processing systemincluding a processor; and a memory that stores executable instructionsthat, when executed by the processing system, facilitate performance ofoperations comprising: encrypting at least one true data signalresulting in an encrypted at least one true data signal; encrypting aplurality of decoy data signals resulting in encrypted decoy datasignals; scrambling the encrypted at least one true data signal and theencrypted decoy data signals at a channel scrambler to generate aplurality of scrambled signals, wherein the channel scrambler iscontrolled by a scrambling key to facilitate hopping an original channeland transmitter assignments for sequential packets of both the at leastone true data signal and the plurality of decoy data signals; andtransmitting the plurality of scrambled signals using a plurality ofmulti-channel secure channel-hopping transmitters, wherein the pluralityof scrambled signals are received at a plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping receivers, wherein a channel de-scrambler is coupled toeach of the plurality of channel-hopping receivers and is controlled bya de-scrambling key to facilitate recovery of the at least one true datasignal from the plurality of scrambled signals.
 12. The device of claim11, wherein the plurality of multi-channel secure channel-hoppingtransmitters are positioned at a first set of physically disparatelocations, and the plurality of multi-channel secure channel-hoppingreceivers are positioned at a second set of physically disparatelocations.
 13. The device of claim 11, wherein the encrypted at leastone true data signal and the encrypted decoy data signals are applied asseparate parallel inputs to the channel scrambler.
 14. The device ofclaim 11, wherein the processing system operates at least partially inan electrical domain and at least partially in an optical domain. 15.The device of claim 11, wherein the plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping transmitters comprise an array of optical transmittingdevices each operating at a different wavelength.
 16. A non-transitorymachine-readable storage medium comprising executable instructions that,when executed by a processing system including a processor, facilitateperformance of operations comprising: encrypting at least one true datasignal resulting in an encrypted at least one true data signal;encrypting a plurality of decoy data signals resulting in encrypteddecoy data signals; scrambling the encrypted at least one true datasignal and the encrypted decoy data signals at a channel scrambler togenerate a plurality of scrambled signals, wherein the channel scrambleris controlled by a scrambling key to facilitate hopping an originalchannel and transmitter assignments for sequential packets of both theat least one true data signal and the plurality of decoy data signals;and transmitting the plurality of scrambled signals using a plurality ofmulti-channel secure channel-hopping transmitters positioned atphysically disparate locations, wherein the plurality of scrambledsignals are received at a plurality of multi-channel securechannel-hopping receivers positioned at physically disparate locations,wherein a channel de-scrambler is coupled to each of the plurality ofchannel-hopping receivers and is controlled by a de-scrambling key tofacilitate recovery of the at least one true data signal from theplurality of scrambled signals, wherein the processing system operatesat least partially in an electrical domain and at least partially in anoptical domain.
 17. The non-transitory machine-readable storage mediumof claim 16, wherein the at least one true data signal and the decoydata signals comprise electrical signals and are encrypted in theelectrical domain.
 18. The non-transitory machine-readable storagemedium of claim 16, wherein the plurality of scrambled signals aretransmitted in the optical domain.
 19. The non-transitorymachine-readable storage medium of claim 16, wherein at least one of theplurality of multi-channel secure channel-hopping receivers comprises atransceiver.
 20. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium ofclaim 19, wherein the transceiver comprises an optical transceiver and aradio transceiver.